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THE VALUATION OF ASSETS:
CAPITALIZATION PROBLEMS
1. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
IN ALL of the analysis of earnings rates contained in this
volume we have used as our base either the capitalization
or total capital figures shown by the balance sheets of the
corporations in the various samples. But the problems of
accounting are complex, and the technique of keeping cor-
porate books and preparing corporate statements is flexible,
if not frequently capricious. To be sure, the data of nearly
all of our samples comprise Government figures; and we
may properly assume that most industrial data reported to
the Government are in the main subject to fewer vagaries of
accounting procedure than is the case with many figures
compiled merely for the information of stockholders or the
general public. Nevertheless, considerable variation of prac-
tice between individual corporations is possible; and it be-
comes necessary for us to ascertain the extent to which
caprices of accounting procedure may influence our figures.
In all of this discussion, however, let it be clearly under-
stood that our interest is in the individual corporation only
in so far as its figures contribute to, or exercise any signifi-
cant influence upon, the value of a general group average
or the structure of a frequency distribution in which the cor-
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poration is included. We fully recognize that in any indi-
vidual case, no correspondence whatever between actual
investment in terms of the capital contributed by security
holders (both originally and through the reinvestment of
earnings) and the reported balance sheet figures may obtain.
But we are interested in such individual cases of gross
understatement or overstatement of capital only for the
light which estimates of their extent and prevalence may
throw upon the probable defectiveness of our data for each
industrial division, major group, and minor group, these
several groups each being considered both in absolute terms
and relative to one another.
Variations of accounting practice affect both our balance
sheet and income account figures. Those affecting balance
sheet items are of greater importance in our present prob-
lem than those which influence the income account; the
operation of the income tax law has brought about a greater
degree of standardization (although itisstill far from
exact) in general corporate accounting for income than for
balance sheet items. We shall be concerned with both
matters in this chapter, but shall approach the several
problems involved from the point of view of the balance
sheet and comment upon related charges to income as it
becomes necessary to do so.
For our purposes, there are two principal sources of
possible error (or if not of error, at least of the possession
by our samples of heterogeneous accounting data blended
in unknown proportions). Arbitrary policies of valuation
make it possible for any company. to carry either intangible
items, such as patents and goodwill, or tangible capital
assets, such as plant and equipment, upon either an ultra-
conservative or an extravagant basis. And, in the case of
any individual corporation,it may be repeated that the[526] INDUSTRIALPROFITS
widest variations of policy are possible in this respect. As
George 0. May has strikingly expressed it:
"Capital assets may be stated on the basis of cost or
on the basis of a valuation. It may be a pre-war or a
post-war basis. The cost may be a cost in cash or a cost
in securities. If the latter, it may be a legal cost measured
by a par value of a grossly inflated stock issue if the cor-
poration was formed early in the century, or it may be
greatly understated if the assets were acquired by a
recent issue of stock without common [par] value." '
\'Vemay examine in turn these questions of patents and
goodwill and plant and equipment valuations, as they affect
our data.
2. VALUATION AND ABSOLUTE EARNiNGS RATES: PATENTS
AND GOODWILL
One simple and well-known way to inflate or water the
stock issue of a corporation, happily somewhat less fre-
quently practiced by large companies today than in the past,
is to offset a capital liability by a substantial and often
largely fictitious patent or goodwill account. These two
items are not of exactly the same character from either an
economic or an accounting point of view. Many economists
would not admit goodwill as an item of capital, although
they would grant that it constitutes an item of 'individual
capital' to the owner of the business if it results in an accre-
tion of income. Most accountants doubtless would recognize
either item if it had been purchased, although, if not pur-
chased, goodwill might be looked upon with a somewhat
more suspicious eye by the conservative accountant than
would patents developed atsubstantial and specifically
.4rnerican Statistical .4ssociation Journal (December 1929), p.444.VALUATION PROBLEMS [527]
ascertainablecost by the corporation itself. Frequently, of
course, the development of new patented devices results in
a decidedly higher rate of physical productiveness on the
part of the enterprises that either perfect or eventually
utilize them. A patent account in such cases is, of course,
justified upon economic grounds whether the patent has
been developed by the corporation in question or purchased
by it from another company or persons. The extent to which
patents may thus legitimately be capitalized is, of course, a
moot question: no rule of valuation exists and, as the his-
tory of donated treasury stock witnesses, the courts will
approve almost any value placed upon such an asset by vote
of a board of directors, unless fraud can be established.
Nevertheless, the presence of large patent and goodwill
accounts—that is, large relative to the total of other assets
—in industries in which the production process is not pecu-
liarly one that makes large use of patented machinery, or
of copyright materials, may be viewed with suspicion. No
absolute proportion can be stated as being for
patents and goodwill to bear to the capitalization or to
total capital of an industry or enterprise; but there would
perhaps be agreement that if, for an industrial group in
which the conditions which have just been indicated do not
generally prevail, the proportion of such intangibles to capi-
tal were more than 20 or 25percent this would constitute
presumptive evidence of overcápitalization.2
Conversely, it perhaps will be agreed that if in industries
of this kind (where peculiar conditions involving the use
of patented machinery or copyrights are absent) less than
10 or 15 per cent of either capitalization or total capital
2Ifa definition of 'overcapitalization' in this connection is necessary, let
the term mean a capitalization figure substantially in excess of either the
cost of the assets or, as the Courts say, of the 'prudent investment' necessary
for their acquisition.[528] INDUSTRIALPROFITS
is accounted for by the figures at which patents and good-
will are carried, then no substantial overcapitalization is
present, upon the score of these two items. 'We may thus
examine the data of our samples, both by industrial divi-
sions and by major and minor groups, to check the situation
in these terms. All data are for 1925, the latest year for
which they are available.
The ratio used will be that of combined patents and good-
will to capitalization, the latter term, as defined in earlier
chapters, constituting the total ol the following balance
sheet items:(i)preferred stock,(ii)common stock,
(iii)surplus and undivided profits. Since in nearly all of
our Manufacturing and Trading groups, capitalization is
not very different from total capital (the latter defined as
capitalization plus bonded debt), we regard the one
result as being substantially the same as that which would
be obtained through the use of the other figure.
For our large corporations series (2,046 corporations in
All Manufacture), total patents and goodwill amount to
slightly over one billion dollars, while total capitalization
is 21 billion dollars. The ratio of patents and goodwill to
capitalization is thus 4.9 per cent.
Divided into 11 major groups, ratios of less than 5per
cent are found in Textiles, Leather, Lumber, Chemicals,
Clay, Stone and Glass, and Metals. Ratios of from 5to10
per cent are found in Paper and Special Manufacturing
Industries. The Food and Rubber groups show ratios of
11.1 and 12.0 per cent, respectively.
The only ratio above 12 per cent is found in the major
Printing, where the proportion of patents and good-
willtocapitalizationis20.0 percent. This figureis
accounted for largely by the high ratio of 28.1 per cent
which, as will appear when we discuss the several minor
groups below, characterizes Newspaper and Magazine Pub-VALUATION PROBLEMS [529]
lishing;and doubtless is to be justified in large part upon
the basis of copyrights which give to such assets as plates
and electrotypes a value (on the basis of either cost or
market) that substantially exceeds the expense of setting up
type or casting plates.
In order to ascertain the maximum possible effect that
patents and goodwill items carried on the balance sheets of
these corporations could have upon our final figures, let us,
however, make an extreme assumption which is obviously
not justified: namely, that none of the patents and goodwill
shown by any major group represents an actual investment.
If this were so, to what degree would the complete exclusion
of patents and goodwill affect our computed earnings rates
for each major group?
Obviously, to no very great extent. Take, for example,
the Metals group in which the proportion of patents and
goodwill to capitalization is 4 per cent. The rate of net
income to investment in the Metals group for the year in
question was 12.1 per cent. If we subtract the nearly 400
million dollars shown as patents and goodwill for this group
from its nine billion of capitalization and then recompute
the percentages of net income to this capitalization the new
earnings rate is changed only to 12.5 per cent. Similarly, in
Food Products where the proportion of patents and good-
will to capitalization is 11 per cent, the new earnings rate
computed on the reduced capitalization becomes 11.4 in-
stead of 10.1 per cent. Even in Printing, where the high
20 per cent ratio of patents and goodwill to capitalization
obtains, the original earnings rate of 17.2 per centis
changed oniy to 21.5 per cent.
How different, if at all,is the case with the 73 minor
manufacturing groups? Sixteen groups show proportions of
patents and goodwill to capitalization of 10 per cent or
over. The presence of this amount of patents and goodwill,[530] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
however, makes no marked difference in the rates of return.
But eight other groups show patents and goodwill items
that are 20 per cent or more of capitalization—the highest
ratio being 42 per cent. One of these groups, as has been
previously remarked, is Newspaper and Magazine Publish-
ing, while three others are Proprietary Preparations, Toilet
Preparations and Printing Machinery. In them all, copy-
rights, secret formulae or patented special devices could
readily justify at least a part of the patent and goodwill
account carried on the books. But again assuming that none
of the amount so carried is justified, and recomputing, we
obtain the ratios given below.
Original earnings rate New earnings rate
Minor group (including intangibles)(excluding intangibles)
Confectionery 18.4 22.9
Tobacco 15.0 20.3
Men's Clothing 110 15.7
Stationery 6.1 8.8
Newspaper Publishing 18.2 25.3
Proprietary Preparations 21.0 28.0
Toilet Preparations 314
Printing Machinery 9.1 12.1
It is clear that only in Toilet Preparations is this differ-
ence really significant. And even in this group itis to be
remarked that the extreme assumption which we have made
as to the utter worthlessness of patents and goodwill as a
valid investment item is not in the least justified, and that
were one-half to two-thirds of their stated values allowed
and retained in the capitalization base, the resulting earn-
ings rate would then not differ so very significantly from
that originally computed. Our conclusion, therefore, in the
case of our manufacturing corporations samples, is that
patents and goodwill items in the balance sheet do not in
any significant way invalidate our results.
With respect to the large series of trading corporationsVALUATION PROBLEMS
the results are so similar that
viewed in detail. For All Trad
and goodwill to capitalization
Trade it is 10.2 per cent; for
cent; for 'Wholesale and Retail
minor groups show very small
two do they run as high as 15
The small Manufacturing
show much the same results as
aggregate patents and goodwill
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they need not here be re-
e the proportion of patents
is8 per cent; for Retail
Wholesale Trade, 2.7 per
Trade, 7.1 per cent. Most
ratios indeed, and in only
per cent.
corporations series samples
the large corporations. The
figure for all manufacturing
ARNINGSRATES:
The second possible major source of invalidity in our
balance sheet figures is the plant and property account. If
assets are in some cases stated upon a cost (or cost less
normal physical depreciation) basis, and in other cases on
the basis of appraisals, then to this extent our data are of
a hybrid character; and if those appraisals which are con-
servative do not exactly offset those which are extravagant,
we have no assurance that our computed earnings rates
reflect the actual returns upon the investment that really
accrue to the security holders. 'We are unable to check this
point in quantitative terms as definitely as we could check
the items of goodwill and patents; but certain general
groups combined, however, is slightly higher:. 6.1 against
4.9 per cent.
For the small corporations series in Trade, aggregate
figures are not available, but of 18 Trading groups, only
three showed proportions of patents and goodwill to capi-
talization that exceeded 10 per cent, the highest of these
three being 20 pe.r cent. Clearly, our general conclusion for
Manufacturing likewise applies here.[532] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
observations may enable us to form an opinion with respect
to the broad limits of such probable discrepancies.
Again, if we take only one company, we find that the
amount at which the plant account is carried may bear no
relation to the investment made. We do not undertake to
say that it may bear no relation to the 'value' of the plant.
What the value of any industrial plant is as of any given
date (unless value is defined simply as cost and adequate
records are available to disclose it) is something which can-
not be determined with precision by anyone. The market
value of a plant obviously depends upon its earnings but
what these earnings will be for the future years of the
plant's life and, even assuming a fair stability and perma-
nence of earnings, what should be the 'number of years
purchase' used in calculating the valuation are controversial
economic, accounting and legal matters on which we do not
here propose to enter. For present purposes, in appraising
the effect of variations in accounting policy our data,
it will be sufficient to regard original cost less depreciation
as a norm, and to inquire concerning the possible discrep-
ancy between the sum of the positive deviations above this
norm and the sum of those below it,in the data for any
industrial group.
Some very large companies are conservative with respect
to depreciation charges and their plant accounts. One of
the best-known instances is the General Electric Company,
which as of the end of 1928 carried plants that cost $205
millionat $47.5million.3This company not oniy makes an
adequate annual charge for physical depreciation, but in
addition charges a further generous portion of the value
of its plant to an account called 'general plant reserve'. The
two accounts, 'general plant reserve' and 'depreciation', are
'.4nnual Report for 1928, p.6.VALUATION PROBLEMS [533]
notseparated in the published balance sheet; nor are charges
to them shown separately in the published income statement.
From various published figures that are given, however, it
may be seen that the charge to this generalplant reserve
account can scarcely constitute any very great proportion of
either net income or the amount that annual net income
would be were this charge not made. The combined charge to
the two accounts, in 1928 for example, was but $7.5million,
whereas the net profit figure in 1928 was $57
Our immediate interest is in seeing what influence such
charges to 'plant reserves' have upon the stated earnings
and asset figures of such corporations as the General Elec-
tric Company, in terms of specific problems of profits and
profit rates discussed in this volume.
Charges to plant and equipment beyond what are re-
garded as normal depreciation rates proper may, of course,
often be quite justified from both the economic and account-
ing points of view; certainly from the standpoint of business
policy an excellent case can be made for the practice.5 But
4Before interest payments on funded debt. The net income figure after
such charges was 54 million. The two terms'profit'and 'income'are
used in this chapter as in the other parts of the volume (i.e., not as used
in the General Electric or any other particular corporation's statement),
but both concepts are frequently had in mind in connection with the valua-
tion problems under discussion.
In its 1926 report (from which paragraphs later published in the 1928
report are taken) the General Electric Company argues with cogency:
"Normal depreciation on buildings and equipmentisbased upon the
estimated average effective life of each unit. It does not take into considera-
tion the rapid obsolescence of plants and machinery in a rapidly develop-
ing industry like ours. The value of a plant, therefore, cannot safely be
determined by first cost or by appraisal on the basis of reproduction cost
less normal depreciation.
"It is for these reasons that your Company has followed the policy of
providing a general plant reserve in excess of normal depreciation rates,
so as to enable it to take promptly out of service buildings or equipment
which, although not worn out physically, are inefficient and uneconomical.
Failure to provide suchareserve would make the management much
slower to abandon inefficient buildings and machinery, and would make the[534] INDUSTRIALPROFITS
fairly or otherwise, the General Electric Company is re-
garded not only by the electrical machinery industry but
also by the business and accounting world generally as con-
stituting an extreme case of conservatism in accounting pro-
cedure. If, therefore, we are able to estimate within rather
close limits what the maximum possible effect of the General
Electric Company's exceptional practice—from the point of
view of business policy, let it be repeated, perhaps the sound
one—can have upon the consistency of its figures with the
data for other corporations in the Electrical Machinery
minor group of our sample, we may be able to form some
Company less able to meet new conditions and, therefore, less effective in
economical production and in competition.
"An illustration of this necessity is provided by the experience of your
Company during the past four years, during which time fifteen factory
properties have been sold, having a first cost of $3,727,749 against which
normal depreciation reserves of $1,005,930 had been set aside, leaving a
book value of $2,721,819. These properties were finally sold for $2,410,028,
or a loss from first cost of $1,317,721, and a book loss of $311,791 which
was charged against the general plant reserve. This illustration does not
include machinery and equipment, on which further loss was sustained."
Such reserve strength with which to meet unforeseen losses of this char-
acter might, of course, be built up without specific charges toa general
plant reserve before the calculation of net income, ifa larger proportion
of net income were simply retained in the business as a part of general
surplus account. This would, however, imply that they were a part of
profits rather than expense. But were such charges to expense not specifically
made, and the net income figure thus appeared as a larger amount, stock-
holders would the business as being more prosperous and might
demand larger dividends. The General Electric Company feels that such
larger dividends are not justified, and even if not paid, the in
question should not even appear on the balance sheet as a profit surplus—
the accounting philosophy involved being that the final determination of
what actually has been earned as net income in any one year cannot be
made with precision until the experience of other years shows what has
really been the rate of plant and equipment obsolescence in the earlier year.
This is quite consistent, of course, with the statement that the value of the
plant cannot be determined either by first cost or by appraisal less normal
(physical) depreciation.
I am indebted to Mr. J. W. Lewis of the General Electric Company for
information concerning the company's accounting policy in several respects.VALUATION PROBLEMS [535]
general conclusion concerning the significance of our figures
in that, as well as other, minor groups.
As regards the possible effect on net profit figures, it is
first to be observed that theoretically a very liberal policy
of provision for depreciation and obsolescence might have
no great effect upon the income statement. This would be
true only if new plant construction each year approximately
equalled in cost the value of the old plant and equipment
retired from service during that year; and if the rate at
which new construction weie written off were kept the same
from year to year. This situation seldom., if ever, prevails,
although in an old established enterprisein which the
demand for the product has become entirely stabilized, an
approach to it might result. This, however, is by no means
the case with most companies, and it is not true of General
Electric. Nor does the General Electric Company, asis
sometimes alleged, in any sense ever charge off all, one-half
or one-third of the entire cost of a new plant's construction
—or anything approaching these amounts—against the
earnings of the particular year in which the plant is built.6
Taking the 1928 figure as an example, we find that the
charge to 'general plant reserve and depreciation' as before
stated was seven and one-half million dollars, while the net
profit for that year, reckoned after this charge, was 57
million. Let us assume that half of this charge had not been
made. Net profit would then have been shown as about
61 million dollars instead of 57 million. Running similar
calculations back to 1923, the results, in round numbers,
are:
°The fact that in a particular year it may sometimes be observed that
the Company's charge against general plant reserve and depreciation has
amounted to either approximately the cost of new plant construction or to




One-halfplant reserve one-half plant reserve
and depreciation Net anddepreciation
Year profit c/large
1928 4- 57 61
1927 5 52 57
1926 6 50 56
1925 5 43 48
1924 5 45 50
1923 4 37 41
Nextwe may see what effect such charges have upon a
company's invested figures as shown by the balance
sheet. Net figures shown for capital assets are, of course,
lower because of these accumulated charges than would
otherwise be the case. The capitalization figures that appear
on the liability side of the balance sheet (or, alternatively,
a net worth figure computed by the subtraction of liabilities
to other than stockholders from the total assets figure) may
or may not be materially reduced because of the lower valu-
ation at which fixed plant and equipment are carried. If a
company were habitually to pay out all of its reported earn-
ings in dividends, then an exceptionally large charge against
plant account would merely result in the retention in the
business of revenues (we do not undertake to call them
net) that would otherwise have appeared as profits and
would have been disbursed to shareholders. Total assets
would be larger, by the amount of the excess depreciation
charge, than if the charge had not been made and the sum
had been paid out as dividends. To be sure, the figure repre-
senting the amount thus retained in the business is not
earmarked and has no separate entity as a specific asset.
It may be that the cash or United States Government securi-
ties account is larger in consequence, or it may be that
inventories or other assets are greater—but in any event
the figure is there. Unless a large truly secret reserve is
created by charging new construction against the operationsVALUATION PROBLEMS [537]
ofthe year and not showing the asset upon the books at
all, or unless the value of existing assets is written down
more rapidly than they are being exhausted and an out-
standing no-par stock issue is devaluated or capital surplus
written down in consequence, no concealment of total assets
—or of stockholders' equity or invested capital—would
take place. This is, of course, true whether the method of
recording depreciation on a balance sheet is by showing the
originalcost of the plant account, with the accumulated re-
serves against it entered as a subtraction and the net valua-
tion extended, all on the asset side of the statement, or by
showing the gross fixed investment figure as an asset and
the reserve against it as a liability.7
The case is different, however, when, as is customary, a
company regularly carries a part of its earnings to surplus.
Here an excess charge against the plant account may result
in appreciably smaller capitalization figures on the balance
sheet and may fail to reflect assets retained in the business
as reserves. in the General Electric Company, for example,
we recall that the charge to plant reserve and depreciation
in 1928 was $7.5million.If only, say, $3.5millionhad
been charged and if out of the net profit figure (thus in-
creased from $57to$61 million) the same dividends were
paid, then instead of approximately $8 million being carried
to surplus, about $12 million would have been added.
Under the second procedure, the depreciation reserveis shown asa
liability item (as in published statements of the General Motors Corpora-
tion,for example), but presumably not inthe 'Capital' or 'Net Worth'
section of the liabilities side of the balance sheet (cf.R.B. Kester, 1lccount-
lug Theory and Practice (1928), II, 188). If the valuations are at all sound
from the point of view of the fairly correct appraisal of future earnings
and the necessity for replacing depreciated and obsolete equipment, the
reserve against plant has, of course, no proper placeasa'surplus'or
'profit' reserve and constitutes no part of capitalization. It does, however,
increase the amount of total assets shown by the balance sheet. (To this
extent, total assets would be a less reliable investment base than the capital-
ization or total capital figures employed in the present volume.)
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But the total capital or capitalization figure would be far
higher than that actually shown because the same procedure
would have been followed in preceding years—in other
words, these annual charges to plant reserve which for
purposes of the present argument we regard as 'excess'
charges would have accumulated over a period. As of the
end of 1928, the General Electric accumulated general plant
and depreciation reserve was 158 million dollars. What
proportion of this represents a normal or customary depreci-
ation reserve and what part conservative excess cannot be
told from the published figures, but the annual 'excess'
charge, in recent years at least, has been something less
than the depreciation rate proper.8 Let us, however, again
make an assumption more extreme than the known figures
warrant, and arbitrarily say that of this accumulated
depreciation reserve belongs to the surplus account—that is,
should be put there in order to construct a capitalization
figure that reflects a more conventional (albeit quite pos-
sibly less correct) valuation figure for plant and equipment.
Upon this basis, the total capital of the company as of
1928 becomes 437 million instead of 358 million—the hypo-
thetical figure thus being 22 per cent larger than that shown
by the published statement. This is a substantial difference.
Let us, in the same way, run the calculations back to 1923.
Capital plus one-half
Capital 1 plantand depreciation







Includesgeneral reserves, but not depreciation and plant reserves.
2Accumulatedreserve as of end of each year
8This has been stated to the writer by an oflicial of the Company.VALUATION PROBLEMS [539]
We may now employ this set of calculations in connection
with the set of income figures previously computed, in which
we added to each year's published profit figure one-half of
the depreciation and plant reserve charge for that year; and
in this way we can ascertain the difference in earnings rates
as calculated with the two sets of income and capitalization
figures. The results are given below (our computed figures
being termed 'hypothetical').
Earnings rates on basis of







It thus becomes apparent that a conservative policy of
valuation may result in a somewhat higher ratio of net
earnings to capitalization. The differences, however, are
not large.9 To what extent may we reasonably expect dif-
ferences of this, or even of twice as serious a nature, to
influence our general figures for an entire industry?
Taking as an example the minor group Electrical Ma-
chinery, we find that our large corporations series contains
Moreover, in the case of General Electric, we have not mentioned that
its furniture and fixtures account (for furniture and appliances other than
in its factories)is carried at $1, as is also its patent account. However,
these additional evidences of conservatism may not need to be considered
in addition to the adjustment we have already made of the plant account,
in calculating our hypothetical figures. The office furniture and appliances
account would be small in comparison with the general plant account;
while the patent account is not susceptible of any estimation. The practice
qf carrying patents at nominal sums is, however, fairly widespread among
large corporations. In any event, we may perhaps be permitted to guess
that our extreme procedure in adding as much, as of the general
plant reserve to the surplus account constitutes a sufficiently generous ad-
justment of the figures to put the company upon a parity with most other
large corporations that are distinguished neither for especial conservatism
nor for recklessness in their accounting policies.[540] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
54 companies in this group. In 1928 the aggregate capital-
ization of these 54 companies is shown as 848 million dol-
lars, while the combined net income is 140 million. Let us
assume that the General Electric Company is one of these
54 companies.'0 If so, its capitalization and income figures
would exercise a considerable influence upon any totals or
arithmetic averages derived from the data of the sample,
for almost any basis of valuation that might be
adopted its capitalization would account for from one-third
to one-half of the total for the group. Suppose, therefore,
that we recast the data of the sample by taking cognizance
of an assumed undercapitalization for General Electric—
that, in other words, we increase the group's capitalization
by an amount• equal to one-half of the General Electric
Company's accumulated depreciation and plant reserve
shown inits published report, and likewise increase the
income of the group by one-half of the charge to that
account made for 1928. If this is done, the total capital
of the group becomes 980 instead of 901 million, and its
total profit becomes 146 instead of 142 million. The per-
centage of profit to capital is decreased from 15.8 to 14.9
as a result of this revision. Had the amount by which the
General Electric Company is regarded as being 'undercapi-
talized' been made twice as great in the calculations, the
change in the final earnings rate for the group would still
10The Source-Bookdoesnot identify any of the corporations in the vari-
ous samples, but the total capitalization—nearly abillion dollars—shown
for this sample of large corporations in the electrical industry makes it
fairly certain that none of the three or four leading corporations engaged
in this fieldis omitted from the sample—just as the total of capitalization
shown by the sample for the group Motor Vehicles (almost two billion
dollars in 1928) makes it certain that both the General Motors Corpora-
tion and the Ford Motor Company are included in the figures for the
Motor Vehicles group. Thus while no identification of corporations is pos-
sible, the reader who studies the figures for any minor group, and who is
conversant with the general composition of the industry examined, can in
most cases tell whether the very largest companies are included.VALUATION PROBLEMS [541]
have been reduced merely from 15.8 to 14.2 per cent; and
were the assumed figure made three times as great, the
change would be from 15.8 to 13.6 per cent.
It thus appears that no significant change in the results
is likely to take place, in consequence of even a substantial
measure of undervaluation by any one company in the in-
dustry. This, of course, assumes that the dominant or lead-
ing company is the only company in the industry for which
the valuation figures deviate markedly from the customary
accounting practice. But assume, however, that several large
companies 'undervalue' their assets. Even if the number and
size of the companies that do so are sufficient to bring as
much as one-half of the industry's capitalization into ques-
tion, but if the average extent of the deficiency is not much
greater than in the General Electric Company, the differ-
ence between the two earnings rates involved would still
not be appreciable. The effect would be to increase total
capitalization by as much as one-seventh or one-sixth and
somewhat to increase income, but in a much lower propor-
tion; thus the newly derived earnings rate would in no case
be significantly different from the old.
Much the same reasoning holds good for instances of
overcapitalization. Even if, in a small minor group sample,
one-third of the reported capitalization of the group be-
longed to firms which on an average reported double the
amount of capital actually invested, a correction based upon
this assumption would reduce the capitalization for the
group by only one-sixth. If the earnings rate upon the capi-
talization as originally shown had been 15 per cent,it
would become 18 per cent upon the reduced base; if it had
been 10 per cent previously, it would become 12 per cent.
'We have, however, made extreme assumptions. Itis
unlikely that, in any industrial group for which we have
data, as much as one-third or one-half of the capitalization[542] INDUSTRIALPROFITS
is in error by as much as one-half of, or double, itself.
Furthermore, it is even more unlikely that the deviations
are all on one side—that is to say, it is just as improbable
to assume that in a given industry all firms that do not carry
their plants at actual investment less depreciation accumu-
lated at the usual rate show them at more than this figure,
as it is to assume that all corporations in the industry carry
their plants at less than this amount. The very diversity of
practice in this respect may let us feel sure that in nearly
every industrial group some corporations do the one thing,
some the other. This is not to assume that the two sets of
discrepancies obligingly cancel each other. But it remains
true that the influence of undervaluation by certain domi-
nant firms in an industry upon the figures for the group as a
whole is partially offset by whatever dvervaluation is prac-
ticed by other firms in the group. To this extent, our limits
of probable error are even narrower than the possible ones
which were indicated above when the effects of over- and
undervaluation were considered separately.
Undoubtedly, industries differ somewhat in the extent to
which arbitrary accounting practices of one sort or another
prevail. But there is no reason for assuming that the dif-
ference between industries in this respect is as marked as
between different companies in any given industry. At least,
there is no evidence whatever to show that, with respect to
valuation policies, a conservative point of view, or the re-
verse, is the peculiar attribute of all or most of the execu-
tive personnel in one industry as compared with another.
If anything, our assumption would be that the reverse is
more true, that such conservatism, or its absence, constitutes
an intellectual quality that varies with the temperament and
personality of the individuals in every industry and that
such differences as may chance to prevail generally, in oneVALUATION PROBLEMS [543]
industryas compared with another in this respect, can be
neither of a broad nor of a well-defined nature.
As between the companies in any one industry, it may
be reiterated, we know that variations of practice prevail,
although we are unable to measure with any precision their
general extent. But in concluding this part of the discussion,
certain general observations, to which doubtless many corn-
petentobservers among students of finance and accounting
would agree, may be made.'1
The tendency towards overcapitalization on the part of
large American corporations, so prevalent in the last decade
of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twen-
tieth, has not only abated but in some instances reversed
itself. Most of the old 'watered stock' corporations that
have remained in business through the period to which our
data pertain have 'grown up to' their capitalizations. If
anything, the present tendency among large corporations is
to undervalue rather than overvalue their capital assets.
The General Electric Company, used for illustrative pur-
poses in this chapter, although a conspicuous instance of
conservatism in this respect, is only one of many.
Many smaller companies undoubtedly greatly overvalue
their assets, especially their fixed property accounts. Partly
this is because the smaller corporations in the main are those
that make the least use of public accountants and outside
Some keen Critics would not. Dr. Oswald W. Knauth, who has read
this chapter, holds that the age of an industry probably affects the general
level of its plant and equipment valuations. He says: "I confess that I am
not convinced by the argument ....Isimply don't believe that these varia-
tions in earnings rates in different industries represent the facts. I suggest
that some industries with apparent high rates of return are industries in
which the capital has been all written off, and vice versa. I can't prove it,
but I don't think this proves anything either."
To 'prove' very much here—if proof means toestablish beyond any
doubt—is, of course, difficult. But the author desires to present Dr. Knauth's
statement to the reader, as representing a more skeptical view than the
conclusions of this chapter.[544] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
auditors. Often the inflation of property account may be
undertaken with the deliberate purpose of making a more
favorable impression upon the commercial banks which,
in appraising a balance sheet as the basis of loan extensions,
allow a given margin for excessive valuations before decid-
ing upon the loan. It is perhaps not too hazardous a gen-
eralization to affirm that today large firms are apt to
undervalue their plant accounts and small firms to over-
value them.'2 But while the validity of comparisons between
individual corporations is often seriously affected as the
result of the non-comparability of such valuations, our gen-
eral conclusion is that no significant invalidation of the
figures for most industries probably takes place as the result
of such heterogeneity of accounting data in the Manufac-
turing and Trading divisions.
As to our samples for Finance and Mining, we can be far
less certain. In certain fields of finance, where holding com-
pany pyramided upon holding company often gives the
legerdemain of accounting full play, much is possible. 'While
one minor group in our sample, Savings Banks, is doubtless
entirely free from any such influence, two minor groups,
Investments and All Other Finance, may reflect such arbi-
trary bookkeeping figures very greatly. The three other
minor groups of the Finance samplie, Commercial Banks,
National Banks and Trust Companies, stand in an inter-
mediate position in this respect. Most of the corporations
in them doubtless carry their assets at reasonable figures
(in this case, of course, the assets are mainly securities
rather than physical property owned directly) ;but the
affiliated investment companies of many such institutions
bring up questions of valuation that cannot well be resolved
Thisconclusion relates primarily to the types of manufacturing and
trading corporations for which data are discussed in this volume—not to
holding companies in the financial and public utility fields.VALUATION PROBLEMS [545]
ingeneral terms from data of the sort that are contained
in our samples of these groups. In the Mining division,
problems of charges to depletion, as well as to depreciation
and obsolescence, and in some Mining fields the question of
discovery value (see Ch. 25),probablysubject our samples
to much larger limits of possible error than in the Manu-
facturing and Trading groups.
4. VALUATION AND RELATIVE EARNINGS RATES:
TIME FLUCTUATIONS
'Wehavein the preceding section attempted to indicate
the degree to which arbitrai-y valuations of plant and equip-
ment might affect the data of our samples. Our general
conclusion was that neither the absolute earnings rate for
any one industry nor the comparison of earnings rates be-
tween industries would be so greatly affected by this factor
as to invalidate the comparison of different industries. The
data of most of our samples, however, are for a ten-year
period and while the comparison of earnings rates in differ-
ent industries at any one time may not be at all significantly
affected by discrepancies in valuation policies, there remains
the possibility that any general shift in policies that took
place over the period would affect the year-to-year compari-
son of the figures. To investigate this question, supplemen-
tary information has been obtained from 67 companies
interviewed in the course of a field study.13
The companies interviewed are fairly large, but in most
instances not dominant, corporations. Data were collected
on capital assets for certain years of the period 1919—30;
study was made for the National Bureau of Economic Research
by Henry S. Dennison, with the collaboration of E. R. Burton. The infor-
mation collected on capital assets and valuation policies was obtained spe-
cifically with a view to checking upon the problems presented by the ma-
terial of our samples as discussed in the present chapter.[546] INDUSTRIAL PROFITS
and each corporation was asked whether any change of
policy with respect to the valuation of such assets took place
during the period in question. In some instances, changes
in policy or plant appraisals made in 1931 were reported,
so the answers really relate to the thirteen-year period,
1919—3 1.
Fifty companies reported that 'no change' in policy took
place; while 17 reported reappraisals of plant or changes
of policy.
Of these 17 concerns,
a. Three reported reappraisals and the adoption of a
valuation policy of cost-less-depreciation, either upon all
property owned or upon all subsequent construction;
b. Seven reported reappraisals, but gave no information
on the new valuations;
c. Six either wrote off all goodwill and intangibles, or
substantially reduced these accounts;
d. One reported a change in depreciation and obsoles-
cence policy that resulted in larger annual current charges,
but gave no information on the revaluation of the accumu-
lated reserve and property account.
We have here only 67 companies, but the diversity of
industry is rather pronounced. There are included food
products, rubber goods, electrical machinery, cotton spin-
ning, men's clothing, machine tools, magazine publishing,
writing paper and automobile manufacturing concerns as
well as a few chain store companies. There are, of course,
only one or a few companies in each group, but all major
manufacturing groups, and the retail trade group, are rep-
resented. In size, as measured by sales, most of the corn-
panics involved do an annual volume of business ranging
from approximately 2 to 20 million dollars each, although
a few are much larger, having sales of 50 or 100 million.
With 50 of these 67 companies reporting no changeVALUATION PROBLEMS [547]
whateverintheir valuationpolicy during the decade
19 19—28, it seems not unlikely that this situation is typical
of large manufacturing corporations that are not giant
concerns and that, so far as this type of enterprise is con-
cerned, the year-to-year comparability of at least our large
Manufacturing and Trading corporations samples is not
impaired because of any general changes in valuation policy
during the period in question. It is interesting to find that
of the companies reporting changes, most of those that
gave specific information reduced their valuations of assets,
thus confirming our earlier observation that the present
tendency in the policy of large manufacturing concerns is
in the direction of conservatism rather than of exaggeration
in this respect.